DENYING REPARATION FOR SLAVE AND FORCED LABORERS
IN WORLD WAR II AND THE ENSUING HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS
IMPLICATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE ICJ’S RECENT
DECISION IN JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (GER.
V. IT.: GREECE INTERVENING)
Morgan Lynn Klinzing*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 777

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................ 778
A. Early Restitution ....................................................................... 779
B. Litigation of Forced Labor Claims .......................................... 781
C. The German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility,
and the Future’ ......................................................................... 784
D. Previous Developments and Cases in Italy and Greece ........... 786

III.

CASE ANALYSIS .............................................................................. 788
A. Greek Judgments Enforced in Italy .......................................... 789
B. Italy’s Arguments and the ICJ’s Decisions .............................. 790
1. Italy’s Arguments Against Granting Germany
Sovereign Immunity for Civil Claims Brought in Italy ...... 791
2. Italy’s Arguments Against Germany’s Sovereign
Immunity in Satisfying a Judgment from a Foreign
State ................................................................................... 793
3. Italy’s Arguments in Favor of the Enforceability of
Greece’s Judgments in Italy .............................................. 793
C. Dissents .................................................................................... 794

IV.

ANALYSIS AND CASE IMPLICATIONS .............................................. 796
A. Germany’s Insufficient and Incompetent Reparations and
Foundation ............................................................................... 796
B. The ICJ’s Failure to Recognize an Emerging Trend of
Restrictive Immunity Leaves Victims with No Reliable
Reparations .............................................................................. 797

*

J.D., University of Georgia, 2014; B.A., Emory University, 2010.

775

776

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:775

C. Because of the ICJ’s Ruling, the FSIA May Be in Jeopardy
and the United States Should Take the Lead in Protecting
Victims of Human Rights Violations ........................................ 799
V.

CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 801

2013]

DENYING REPARATIONS FOR SLAVE AND FORCED LABORERS

777

I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1944, twenty-two year old Martha Klein was seized by German
troops in Hungary and forced to move to Austria where she was taken by
train to Ravensbruck, a notorious women’s concentration camp.1 She was
forced to live “in a wooden barracks [without] light, heat, insulation from
rain, running water, or sewage facilities.”2 Two thousand five hundred
women were expected to share one latrine and one washroom.3 Martha had
to sleep with three other women in wooden bunks stacked three tiers high.4
The women were only provided with a “bowl of watery potato-skin and grass
soup each day and a slice of bread twice a week.”5 After waking up at 4:00
a.m., Martha was expected to stand at attention for roll call for hours before
being shipped off to Siemens’ Ravensbruck factory for heavy labor,
manufacturing electronics and communications equipment for the German
Reich.6
The German government refused any compensation or reparation for
Martha and thousands of other surviving forced and slave laborers after
World War II.7 Over forty years later, Martha brought suit in federal court in
New Jersey. Unfortunately, the judge dismissed her claim because of
international policy implications the judge deemed out of his purview.8
Martha’s story is not unusual. Thousands of surviving slave and forced
laborers from many countries had similar experiences.9 Should forced
laborers for private German companies be compensated for their labor in
light of the gross human rights violations they suffered? The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) recently decided a case examining this issue.10
On February 3, 2012, the ICJ published its much anticipated opinion
regarding jurisdictional immunity11 from claims of severe human rights
1

Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1999).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See id. at 284 (noting that plaintiffs argued the established German legislation did not
provide adequate compensation).
9
See, e.g., Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, Inc.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 461
(D.N.J. 1999); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999); Fishel v.
BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1998).
10
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 143 (Feb. 3).
11
Jurisdictional immunity refers to the protection a state is given from a suit being brought
against it in another state’s courts.
2
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violations arising during World War II between September 1943 and May
1945.12 The court ruled for Germany, finding that (1) civil claims could not
be brought in Italy against Germany for war crimes committed by the
German army against Italian nationals, (2) Italy was not allowed to
confiscate a German-owned building located in Italy, and used for noncommercial purposes, to satisfy a default judgment in an Italian court against
Germany, and (3) judgments obtained in Greece against Germany were not
enforceable in Italian courts.13 This Note examines this decision and its
implications.
First, this Note will address the historical background of restitution to
victims after World War II, including previous international human rights
cases in Italy regarding jurisdictional immunity. Second, this note will
explain this specific case, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy: Greece Intervening), and will summarize the ICJ’s findings. The last
section will analyze the potential effect of this ruling on future armed
conflicts and examine whether damages imposed sixty years after the fact
are an effective deterrent against future use of forced labor during armed
conflicts. This section will also analyze the limitations of this ruling and the
dangers of allowing the ICJ to determine the scope of jurisdictional
immunity rather than an international governing body, such as the United
Nations (UN).
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Italy joined World War II in June 1940 on the side of Germany but
surrendered to the Allies and declared war on Germany in September 1943,
when Mussolini was removed from power.14 Much of Italy was still
occupied by German forces, which massacred and deported many Italian
civilians.15 Germany also took many Italian forces captive, used them as
forced labor, and denied them prisoner of war status that would have allowed
them to receive compensation.16
During the war, Germany used
approximately 10 million forced laborers in practically every aspect of
society, from schools and hospitals to industry and the Schutzstaffel
(Germany’s version of the Secret Service; also known as the “S.S.”).17
12

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. 143.
Id. ¶¶ 107, 120, 133.
14
GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II, at
132–33, 616 (1994).
15
Id.
16
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 21.
17
Patricia Chappine, Delayed Justice: Forced and Slave Labor Restitution After the
Holocaust, 46 J. ECUMENICAL STUD. 616, 616 (2011).
13
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A. Early Restitution
While the world initially confronted Germany’s crimes against humanity
in the Nuremburg Trials of 1945, these trials focused on punishing criminal
behavior and not on providing restitution to victims of forced labor and
concentration camps.18 A discussion about compensation for victims was
first initiated by Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949.19 The first compensation
payment was offered to Israel in 1949: Deutsche Mark 10 Million “as a first
direct token that the injustice done to the Jews all over the world has to be
made good.”20 The following year, the Luxembourg Agreements arranged
for West Germany to pay approximately DM 100B to 500,000 Israeli
Holocaust survivors internationally.21
While these payments were
unprecedented, many victims were left with nothing because West Germany
would not pay victims in Communist countries.22 These agreements also
ignored forced or slave laborers because they were deemed to be reparations
under international law and thus were not to be dealt with until after
Germany was unified so the country would have an opportunity to recover
economically.23
Germany became a party to many statutory agreements and treaties
addressing claims by victims of human rights violations.24 German property
was originally seized, but this seizure was terminated in 1946.25 However,
the Agreement Respecting Distribution of German Reparation:
Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and Restitution of
Monetary Gold still obligated Germany to make reparations for Nazi
persecution with the amount dependent on Germany’s ability to pay.26 The
1953 Agreement on German External Debts (the London Agreement)
delayed discussion of these reparations, tolling claims until a final peace
treaty was concluded.27 The London Agreement was vague on whether
18

Id. (citing CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE
FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR, at viii (1998)).
19

STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS

Id.
Id. at 617 (quoting MARILYN HENRY, CONFRONTING THE PERPETRATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE 5 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
25
Agreement Respecting Distribution of German Reparation, Establishment of Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency and Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, 444
U.N.T.S. 69.
26
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation,
May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219.
27
Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3
20
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“reparations” by private parties were to be included.28 In 1953, West
Germany initiated a discussion of reparations for individuals and authorized
payments to persecuted people under the Federal Compensation Law
Concerning
Victims
of
National
Socialist
Persecution
(Bundesentschädigungsgesetz (BEG)).29 However, this law did not include
forced laborers in part because many were not considered victims of National
Socialist persecution.30 Many forced laborers were also denied compensation
because they lacked the necessary territorial link to Germany.31
Germany’s unification in 1989 revived the potential for reparations for
previously uncompensated forced laborers.32 Lawsuits by private parties
against Germany proliferated after a German trial court held on November 5,
1997 that the limitations period for forced labor cases was indeed tolled33 by
the London Agreement until after Germany was unified.34 However, these
claims were no longer tolled after the Two Plus Four Treaty35 became
effective on March 15, 1991.36 The “Two Plus Four Treaty” fashioned
German unification by providing a legal foundation and was viewed as a de
facto peace treaty.37 Moreover, the German Constitutional Court provided
dicta from a ruling on May 13, 1996 indicating that, while public reparations
for forced labor were barred, private parties could still assert claims for
compensation.38 Thus, a flood of litigation ensued as people who had not
been given official compensation and were not afforded the ability to file
[hereinafter The London Agreement]; see also Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, Litigating the
Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 507 (2002).
28
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 507.
29
Id.
30
Paul Christoph Bornkamm, State Immunity Against Claims Arising From War Crimes:
The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the
State, 13 GER. L.J. 773, 774 (2012); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
It.), Counter-Memorial of Italy, 2009 I.C.J. 143, ¶ 2.24 (Dec. 22) (explaining that the
territorial link exception of the BEG denied compensation to persecutees who lived outside of
Germany when it was enacted in 1953).
31
Bornkamm, supra note 30, at 774.
32
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508.
33
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “toll” as “to stop the
running of”).
34
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508.
35
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (with Agreed Minute), Sept. 12,
1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 124.
36
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508.
37
Anja Hense, Limitation of Economic Damages as a ‘Humanitarian Gesture’: The
German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,’ 46 J. CONTEMP. HIST.
407, 410–11 (2011).
38
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 508–09 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] 1996, 94 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVerfGE] 315, 330 (Ger.)).
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claims under German law were now filing claims, both in Germany and
around the world.
B. Litigation of Forced Labor Claims
Former forced laborers saw an opportunity after the German
Constitutional Court implied that individual compensation claims for forced
labor could be asserted individually against Germany and German companies
in German courts.39 Private companies such as Ford Werke, Volkswagen
AG, Siemens, Krupp, Daimler-Benz (now Daimler-Chrysler), and Bayer AG
were facing immense class action suits, especially in the United States.40
Even though many potential plaintiffs were still barred from bringing their
claims and litigants faced many difficulties, private German industry was
fearful of the economic consequences of litigation.41
Many potential plaintiffs were still barred from bringing suit in the United
States for several reasons. The history of the class action suits filed in the
United States exemplifies many of these problems. First, people who were
forced to work for the German government could not bring suit under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity codified in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976.42 However, the only current private company that
could avoid a class action under this doctrine is Volkswagen because it was
owned by the Labor Front of the Reich, a branch of the Nazi party, during
World War II and was not privatized until 1960.43
Second, plaintiffs were unable to bring a claim if the company they
labored for during the war no longer existed and was unable to make
reparation payments.44 This concern was especially great as over fifty years
had passed, and the second half of the twentieth century was a tumultuous
time for industry.45 Additionally, many forced laborers worked for
individual employers who had died or partnerships that had dissolved.46
Furthermore, many German companies have no presence in the United States
that would expose them to liability and are therefore judgment-proof in U.S.
courts.47
39

Hense, supra note 37, at 411.
Id.; Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 509.
41
Hense, supra note 37, at 411; Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 509.
42
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611. See, e.g.,
Sampson v. Germany, 250 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 2001); Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
43
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 510 (internal citation omitted).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 511.
40
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Lastly, many plaintiffs would have been precluded from bringing suit
because of postwar peace treaties.48 Most peace treaties, including Italy’s,
prohibited claims by nationals against the German state and German
nationals.49 Although the original intent was to prevent United States funds
for German recovery from disappearing abroad, these agreements prohibited
forced laborers from receiving any compensation.50
Even those plaintiffs who were able to bring claims faced a long, difficult,
and costly litigation process. The first major procedural hurdle was the
running of the statute of limitations.51 Most plaintiffs relied on the 1953
London Agreement to toll claims for private individuals.52 However, even
this posed a problem as the English and German versions of the treaty (both
held to be official) differed. The tolling language in the English version
stated that “[c]onsideration of claims arising out of the second World
War . . . against the Reich and agencies of the Reich . . . shall be deferred
until the final settlement of the problem of reparation.”53 Instead of merely
referring to “the Reich and agencies of the Reich,” the German version stated
“Reich und im Auftrag des Reichs handelnde Stellen und Personen,” which
translates to “The Reich and offices and person acting at the behest of the
Reich.”54 The English version of the statute only tolled claims against
Germany and German agencies while the German version also included
those acting at the request of the government.55 Additionally, even if the
London Agreement tolled the statute of limitations, German courts have held
that the Two Plus Four Treaty ended the tolling of the statute of limitations.56
Thus, the statute of limitations would have resumed in 1991.57
A final issue regarding the statute of limitations involved determining the
exact limitations period and which law applies when a claim is not brought in
the state in which the cause of action occurred—the law of the forum state or
the law where the cause of action arose. One U.S. judge decided this issue in
favor of the law of the forum state, applying New Jersey, Michigan, or
Delaware statutes of limitations on unjust enrichment, which provide for a
statute of limitations of three or six years.58 Thus, even though this issue was
48

Id. at 512.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 514–15.
52
The London Agreement, supra note 27.
53
Id. art. 5(2).
54
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
Id. at 516.
56
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing tolling of statute of limitations).
57
See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing tolling of statute of limitations).
58
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472–75 (D.N.J. 1999) (implying that
victims are only allowed to bring suit within the statute of limitation for the state they are in).
49
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resolved in the United States, the resulting statute of limitations is still
unpredictable as it varies based on the forum state.
Not only were victims unaware of whether the statute of limitations
prevents their claims, but their claims also may have been precluded by
foreign policy. The United States Supreme Court first recognized this as a
defense in Underhill v. Hernandez,59 by finding for the defendant, a
Venezuelan general acting on behalf of the government.60 German
companies could argue that the German Reich took people from their homes
and determined their paltry living conditions, not the private companies who
merely used their labor. Because judges are often reluctant to get involved in
international affairs and view this as an issue that should be resolved among
the respective governments, they tend use any possible means to dismiss the
claims.61
A third problem litigants faced was difficulty certifying an appropriate
class.62 While many of the cases in the United States purported to include
anyone forced to work for a defendant firm, it was difficult to find that there
were “common questions of fact and law” that “predominate[d] over any
questions affecting only individual members.”63 There were obvious
differences in the plaintiffs’ status, working and living conditions, and
location, making it difficult for them to be certified as a class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.64
A final problem was substantive; victims often struggled to provide
sufficient proof to prevent dismissal of the claim.65 Many companies were
not clearly marked with corporate logos; many records were destroyed; and
often heirs bringing the claim relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence.66

59

168 U.S. 250 (1897).
Id. (holding that where a U.S. citizen was detained in Venezuela by a general in military
control of Bolívar, the U.S. citizen was not entitled to compensation because the general’s acts
were those of the Venezuelan government and not subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts as a
matter of foreign relations).
61
See, e.g., Frumkin v. J.A. Jones, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing the
case under the political question doctrine and the doctrine of international comity); Iwanowa, 67
F. Supp. 2d at 461 (dismissing the case because of the tolling of the statute of limitations);
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing the case under the
political question doctrine); Fishel v. BASF Grp., 175 F.R.D. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (dismissing
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants); Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (dismissing the case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
62
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 519.
63
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
64
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 520–23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
65
Vagts & Murray, supra note 27, at 527–28.
66
Id.
60
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Thus, it was extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prevail, as U.S. judges
dismissed cases for a variety of substantive and procedural reasons.67
Despite these difficulties and the fact that many plaintiffs were still barred
by the statute of limitations, German companies wanted to avoid the major
financial risks associated with large class action suits. Companies were
afraid such cases would damage their public image in the United States, in
turn damaging the business of their subsidiaries.68 Furthermore, a loss in
court could be especially damaging, as preclusion would lead to losses in
other cases as well.69
Liability concerns were especially important in the 1990s when these
claims were being brought. That decade was an extremely competitive time
for international industry, and many German companies were planning major
expansions in the United States.70 German companies did not know whether
the legal actions would lead to sanctions or legislative measures taken in the
United States. German industries were afraid these potential claims could
hang over their heads indefinitely, leading to risk and uncertainty in the
market.71 Germany and the United States entered into talks about a potential
collective compensation settlement that would provide “ ‘legal closure’,
which was seen as an indispensable condition for any payments to former
slave and forced laborers.”72
C. The German Foundation ‘Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future’
Even though Germany had already paid out an estimated sum of $100
billion to victims since World War II, Germany sought legal closure for itself
and its private companies through the establishment of the foundation
Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft73 (the Foundation), which promised an
additional $5 billion to over one million survivors of forced labor.74 The
terms of the Foundation were negotiated by representatives from the United
States, Germany, other European countries, the Jewish Claims Conference,

67

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 61.
Hense, supra note 37, at 412.
69
See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining the effects of preclusion on subsequent claims).
70
For example, VW was about to introduce the Beetle; Daimler-Benz was about to merge
with Chrysler; and Siemens was heavily investing in American expansion. See Hense, supra
note 37, at 412.
71
Id. at 413.
72
Id.
73
Erinnerung, Verantwortung, Zukunft translates to Remembrance, Responsibility, Future.
74
William Drozdiak, Germany Creates Fund to Pay Forced Laborers, WASH. POST, July
18, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WLNR 9051839.
68
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and the German Economy Foundation Initiative.75 Corporate contributions
were capped at 1% to 1.5% of their annual sales for each company,
irrespective of their gains from the use of forced labor.76 This gave the
corporations a reprieve from the economic threat of major class action
lawsuits, while only imposing a minimum economic burden on a miniscule
percentage of their annual sales.77
The German Parliament (Bundestag) passed a law establishing the
Foundation with funds from the government and private companies in
August of 2000.78 The law provided that Germany could declare legal peace
when all litigation in the United States was dismissed.79 Once peace was
declared on May 30, 2001 and all litigation was dismissed in the United
States, certain provisions of the Foundation law were activated, and
payments began the next month.80 The law was supposed to be the
“exclusive avenue to recovery from the German government or German
industry for injuries arising out of the Nazi labor program,”81 but there was
still litigation pending in other countries, besides the United States, for those
still excluded from Foundation payments or those not willing to accept a
small settlement.82
While many appreciated the apology and acceptance of responsibility by
German President Johnannes Rau,83 the Foundation unfortunately did not
provide the comprehensive relief it promised. First, claims had to be filed
within one year and payments were capped at DM 15,000 for slave laborers
and at DM 5,000 for forced laborers.84 Furthermore, these maximum
payments were reserved for only the most aggrieved in each group, as there
were insufficient funds for all victims.85
Second, many of the requirements were difficult to prove, such as the
requirement that anyone who suffered property loss had to prove that their
property or bank accounts were “confiscated with essential, direct, and harmcausing collaboration of German enterprises,” and that value was then

75

Hense, supra note 37, at 415.
Id. at 423.
77
Id.
78
Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the
German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1, 3 (2002).
79
Id. at 4.
80
Id. at 4, 22.
81
Id. at 22.
82
Hense, supra note 37, at 423.
83
Chappine, supra note 17, at 620.
84
Adler & Zumbansen, supra note 78, at 14, 22.
85
Hense, supra note 37, at 420.
76
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transferred into what is today German territory.86 This was difficult for
victims to prove, as many bank records were not meticulously kept during
the war and many were destroyed.87
Additionally, the Foundation excluded anyone who had been a prisoner of
war, unless they were in a concentration camp or part of another specific
group, because prisoners of war “may, according to the rules of international
law, be put to work by the detaining power.”88 Despite previously denying
former Italian military internees prisoner-of war status, the German
government denied them compensation under the Foundation because they
were, in fact, prisoners of war and therefore no public international law gave
them an individual right of compensation for forced labor.89 In this way, the
German government suddenly changed their terminology to avoid
compensating victims.
D. Previous Developments and Cases in Italy and Greece
The case history from the United States resembles the case history in
other countries, except other countries did not drop all pending cases after
the adoption of the Foundation as the United States did.90 At that time cases
were still pending in Italy, and the Italian court had to determine whether it
would grant Germany immunity.
While Italy has no specific legislation regarding foreign states’ immunity,
Italian courts have slowly restricted immunity regarding acts of a foreign
state that are viewed as acta iure imperii91 in civil cases where plaintiffs were
victims of serious humanitarian law violations.92 The Italian courts do this
through a jus cogens93 exception, discussed in the Ferrini case and its
progeny.
The Ferrini case was revolutionary, as it provided a new avenue through
which Italian victims could seek justice.94 In that case, the court held for the
86

Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.
88
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 143, ¶ 26 (Feb. 3).
89
Id. ¶¶ 21, 26.
90
Adler & Zumbansen, supra note 78, at 4, 22.
91
Acta jure imperii are acts that are “[an] exercise of sovereign power.” Ryszard
Piotrowicz, The State of State Immunity: Germany Defeats Italy at the ICJ, 86 AUSTL. L.J.
230, 230 (2012).
92
Elena Sciso, Italian Judges’ Point of View on Foreign States’ Immunity, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1201, 1201 (2011).
93
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining jus cogens as “a mandatory or
peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the international
community as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”).
94
Christian Tomuschat, The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by
87
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first time that Germany could not rely on sovereign immunity as a defense
when a grave human rights violation occurred on Italian soil.95 The plaintiff,
Luigi Ferrini, was captured by the German army in Arezzo, Italy, on August
4, 1944, when he was twenty-eight years old.96 He was deported to Germany
and forced to work in the armaments industry.97 In 1998, he filed a claim
with the Court of Arezzo (Tribunale di Arezzo), which rejected his claim
based on a lack of jurisdiction.98 The Court of Appeal of Florence (Corte di
Appello di Firenze) affirmed the lower court’s ruling in January 2002.99
Later, the Italian Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione) granted his claim
because the “conduct of [Germany] amount[ed] to an international crime that
infringes universal values of the international community as a whole and
rules of jus cogens.”100
Even though no other country follows the Ferrini precedent, including
appellate courts in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom,101 Italy
upheld this decision in a line of cases decided in 2008.102 On May 29, 2008,
the Court of Cassation held in fourteen cases that “states accused of
international crimes do not enjoy immunity from civil jurisdiction in other
states’ courts under customary international law.”103 While acknowledging
there was no specific exception for denying foreign states immunity for acts
jure imperii that violated jus cogens, the Court did note that “a principle
restricting the immunity of a state that has committed crimes against
humanity can be presumed to be in the process of emerging.”104 It went on to
hold that Germany was not immune from suit because of the particular
circumstances of extremely egregious human rights violations originating in
Italy, not in Germany.105 In this way, Italy prevented Germany from
claiming sovereign immunity for violations committed in Italy.

National Institutions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1105, 1115 (2011).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Sciso, supra note 92, at 1207 n.24.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1207 n.23.
101
Tomuschat, supra note 94, at 1133; Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer,
International Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 213, 240–41.
102
Bradley & Helfer, supra note 101; Beth Stephens, Abusing the Authority of the State:
Denying Foreign Official Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses, 44 VAND. J.
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However, there were a few differences between Ferrini and the Court of
Cassation’s rulings in 2008. First, deportation and forced labor were no
longer referred to as “war crimes,” but in the later cases were designated as
“crimes against humanity.”106 Second, the 2008 cases did not refer to the
statute of limitations or jurisdiction in a civil suit.107 Lastly, the fact that
these crimes originated in the forum state was treated as an aside in the 2008
cases, rather than a central argument as in Ferrini.108 These changes made it
easier for other forced laborers to file suit against Germany in Italy.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
On December 23, 2008, Germany filed proceedings against Italy with the
ICJ, alleging that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign immunity by allowing
civil claims for human rights violations that occurred during World War II
from September 1943 to May 1945.109
Germany also claimed Italy violated its sovereign immunity by enforcing
Greek judgments in Italy and confiscating Villa Vigoni, German state
property, to pay the Greek judgments.110
Italy counter-claimed for
reparations owed to Italian victims for violations of international
humanitarian law, but this claim was dismissed by the ICJ on July 6, 2010
because it was outside the jurisdiction on the court.111 Although Italy failed
to contest the dismissal, the ICJ did in fact have jurisdiction over the claim
under Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, which became enforceable on April 18, 1961, as the claim clearly
related to an “international legal dispute” between two states.112
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Id. at 126.
Id.
108
Id.
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Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 143, ¶¶ 1, 15 (Feb. 3).
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Id. ¶ 15.
111
Id. ¶ 38; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Counter-Claim, 2010 I.C.J.
310, ¶¶ 30–31 (July 6).
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Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 41 (“The High Contracting Parties
shall submit to the judgment of the International Court of Justice all international legal
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A. Greek Judgments Enforced in Italy
On June 10, 1944, German forces occupying Greece entered the Greek
village of Distomo, massacred over 200 innocent Greek civilians, and burned
the village in revenge for an attack on an SS unit.113 Relatives of the victims
filed a claim against Germany for compensation on November 27, 1995
before the Court of First Instance of Livadia, Greece.114 The court entered a
default judgment against Germany two years later on September 25, 1997 for
approximately $30 million, stating that Germany did not have jurisdictional
immunity for a breach of jus cogens, such as gross rights violations.115 Three
years later the Hellenic Supreme Court of Greece dismissed Germany’s
appeal on the grounds that it lacked jurisdictional immunity.116 However, the
judgment was not enforced because the Greek Minister of Justice refused the
authorization required under Article 923 of the Greek Code of Civil
Procedure.117
Because both Greece and Germany refused to comply with the court’s
ruling, the plaintiffs resorted to other means of recovery for their tort claims.
First, they applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).118 The
ECHR held that Germany had sovereign immunity, so the plaintiffs’ claim
that Germany and Greece violated Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was
inadmissible.119 Next, the plaintiffs tried to recover in Germany, but the
German courts refused to recognize the default judgments because they were
in violation of Germany’s sovereign immunity.120 After this failure, the
113

Id. ¶ 30; Bornkamm, supra note 30, at 774.
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115
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September 17, 2002, the Special Supreme Court held Germany had sovereign immunity. See
Margellos v. Federal Republic of Germany, Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio [A.E.D] [Special
Supreme Court] 6/2002 (Greece), translated in 129 I.L.R. 525 (2002) (Hellenic Special
Supreme Court 2002); Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 36.
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775.
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Greek plaintiffs tried to recover in Italy following the Ferrini decision.121 On
May 22, 2005, the Court of Appeal of Florence held that the judgment was
enforceable in Italy for the plaintiffs’ judgment on the merits, as well as their
legal expenses.122 On January 12, 2011, the Italian Court of Cassation upheld
the lower courts’ rulings.123
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2007, the Greek Claimants levied a legal charge
claiming ownership of the Villa Vigoni, a German state property near Lake
Como.124 However, judgment against the property was stayed under DecreeLaw No. 63 of April 28, 2010, Law No. 98 of June 23, 2010, and DecreeLaw No. 216 of December 29, 2011 because of pending applications before
the ICJ.125
Germany requested the ICJ find that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign
immunity by allowing civil claims to be brought in Italy against Germany, by
taking measures against German state property located in Italy, and by
declaring Greek judgments enforceable in Italy.126
B. Italy’s Arguments and the ICJ’s Decisions
While Germany admits that its conduct was unlawful,127 it does not
believe there should be unlimited liability for its leaders, as that would lead
to “incalculable financial dimensions” involving the “thousands or perhaps
even millions of victims” of the conflict.128 To determine whether there was
financial liability for the human rights violations, the ICJ applied customary
international law (CIL),129 which requires “a settled practice” and supporting
court opinions.130 The ICJ spends the majority of its decision discussing
121
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2004. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 54.
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Italy’s arguments against granting sovereign immunity for civil claims
brought in Italy. Next, the ICJ discusses the issues of constraining German
state property in Italy and the enforceability of Greek judgments in Italy.131
1. Italy’s Arguments Against Granting Germany Sovereign Immunity for
Civil Claims Brought in Italy
The ICJ first considered whether Italy erred in denying Germany
sovereign immunity for the civil claims brought in Italy on the following
grounds: (1) under CIL, immunity for an acte jure imperii does not extend to
a tort committed in the forum state (the territorial tort principle); and (2)
regardless of where the act happened, no state should be entitled to immunity
where there are severe violations of international humanitarian law with no
other prospect of redress.132
The ICJ did not find that the territorial tort principle granted immunity
under CIL because the civil claims were viewed as acte jure imperii.133 They
dismissed this argument and found against the Italian forced laborers.134 The
territorial tort principle originally arose in the context of insurable risks, such
as traffic accidents with foreign state vehicles, and is usually limited to acta
jure gestionis.135 The reasoning behind this limitation—that insurance
companies should not be able to benefit from the state’s immunity—does not
apply to war-time claims where no insurance is involved.136 Additionally, the
Court found no other country extended the territorial tort to war damages
except for the Ferrini line of cases in Italy and the recent Distomo case in
Greece.137 While denying Italy’s territorial tort argument, the ICJ left open
the issue of whether granting immunity for acta jure imperrii in general,
besides those committed during wartime, was part of CIL.138
Next, the ICJ evaluated Italy’s argument that Germany should not be
given sovereign immunity for civil claims involving severe human rights
violations.139 Italy’s argument can be divided into three parts—the gravity of
the violation, the presence of a jus cogens exception, and the last resort
argument.140
131
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First, the ICJ considered whether the gravity of the violation should
deprive Germany of immunity.141 The Court determined that the gravity of
the offense should not influence a determination of immunity.142 Making
jurisdictional immunity turn on the gravity of the claim would require the
national court to make a judgment on the merits of gravity before
determining jurisdiction.143 This would allow immunity to be refuted by a
careful drafting of the claim and could potentially eliminate sovereign
immunity in all tort claims.144 Although this would push the court towards
upholding immunity, the ICJ also looked to CIL and found no gravity
limitation in the European Convention, the United Nations Convention, or
the draft of the Inter-American Convention.145
Next, the court decided whether the jus cogens violations by Germany
conflicted with sovereign immunity.146 However, the ICJ has previously held
that a jus cogens violation does not confer jurisdiction that a court would not
otherwise possess.147 Thus, even if the acts alleged in Italian court were
violations of jus cogens, CIL for sovereign immunity would still not be
affected.148
Lastly, the ICJ addressed Italy’s argument that the complaint in Italian
courts was the victims’ “last resort” for any compensation.149 While the ICJ
noted that Germany has taken steps to make reparations, it expressed
“regret” that Germany still excludes the majority of Italian military prisoners,
having denied them prisoner-of-war status at the relevant time and then later
viewed them as prisoners-of-war (making them ineligible for later
reparations).150 However as unfortunate that may be, the ICJ did not see any
basis in CIL for denying immunity because there is no “effective alternative
means of securing redress.”151 The ICJ did not find any of these three
arguments, taken individually or jointly, sufficient to deny Germany
sovereign immunity from civil claims in Italy, and thus held that Italy had
wrongly denied Germany the immunity to which it was entitled under CIL.152
141
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2.
Italy’s Arguments Against Germany’s Sovereign Immunity in
Satisfying a Judgment from a Foreign State
Second, the ICJ considered Italy’s claim that it should not grant Germany
sovereign immunity in regards to actions taken against the Villa Vigoni, a
German state property in Italy, because CIL does not provide immunity from
such actions.153 The court noted that CIL governing enforcement immunity
is broader than jurisdictional immunity.154
A state may waive its
jurisdictional immunity without waiving its right to enforcement immunity.155
Thus, the ICJ can rule on enforcement immunity without determining
whether the Greek court violated Germany’s sovereign, jurisdictional
immunity.156 Germany argued that the United Nations Convention has
codified CIL in Article 19, which states that
no post-judgment measure of constraint . . . against property of
a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a
court of another State unless and except . . . (a) the State has
expressly consented to the taking . . . (b) the State has allocated
or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim . . . or
(c) it has been established that the property . . . [is used] for
other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the
territory of the State of the forum. . . .157
The ICJ held that it is clear Germany uses the Villa Vigoni for noncommercial governmental purposes and therefore Italy has violated
Germany’s sovereign immunity under CIL by taking measures against the
Villa Vigoni.158
3. Italy’s Arguments in Favor of the Enforceability of Greece’s
Judgments in Italy
Lastly, the ICJ examined whether Italy should have enforced Greece’s
judgments or granted Germany sovereign immunity.159 The Court noted that
this was a difficult question distinct from the other two above.160 This
153
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158
159
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question turns on whether a third state can enforce a judgment from a court
in one foreign state against the government of another, where that foreign
court has examined the sovereign immunity of the foreign state.161 The ICJ
considered whether Italy respected Germany’s sovereign immunity by
initiating exequatur proceedings against Germany.162
However, by
instituting these proceedings, Italy exercised jurisdiction over Germany and
the Italian courts should have determined whether they would have been
qualified to hear the claim in the first place.163 The ICJ held that it did not
matter whether Greece had jurisdiction over Germany. The fact that Italy
would not have had jurisdiction over Germany was sufficient. Germany was
entitled to sovereign immunity.164
To summarize, the ICJ held that Italy violated Germany’s sovereign
immunity by allowing civil claims for violations of international
humanitarian law committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945,
by “taking ‘measures of constraint’ against the Villa Vigoni,” and by
enforcing Greek judgments for the German Reich’s violations of
international humanitarian law in Greece.165 Additionally, the ICJ held that
Italy must ensure its decisions contrary to this ruling are rendered
ineffective.166
C. Dissents
Three judges, Judge Yusuf, Judge ad hoc Gaja (appointed by Italy), and
Judge Cançado Trindade, filed dissenting opinions. Judge Yusuf disagreed
with the majority’s focus on “whether . . . immunity is applicable to acts
committed by the armed forces of a State . . . in the course of conducting an
armed conflict.”167 Instead, Judge Yusuf focused on Italy’s argument that
Germany has an obligation to make reparations for international human
rights violations where the victims have no other means of redress.168
Judge Yusuf relied on principles of international humanitarian law found
in documents such as a United Nations General Assembly resolution, which
provides a victim of a gross violation of international human rights law with
161
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“access to an effective judicial remedy.”169 He noted that courts are slowly
eroding sovereign immunity by creating exceptions to jurisdictional
immunity, “such as the tort exception, the employment exception, and the
intellectual property exception.”170 Because these victims did not have
access to any other means of redress, Judge Yusuf found no violation of
Germany’s sovereign immunity.171
Judge ad hoc Gaja disagreed with the majority’s view that the territorial
tort principle does not apply to human rights violations committed by hostile
armed forces in the forum state’s territory.172 He noted that just because
military activities may injure people en masse does not mean they should be
exempt from jurisdiction.173 While Judge ad hoc Gaja indicated he would not
support an exception from jurisdiction for torts perpetrated outside the forum
state,174 he did not find that every exercise of jurisdiction by the Italian courts
was a breach of sovereign immunity under international law.175
Lastly, Judge Cançado Trindade, former President of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, wrote a lengthy dissent detailing his disagreement
with all of the majority’s holdings.176 In his concluding twenty-six point
summary of his argument, he noted that state immunity is a privilege and
cannot be an abstraction of international law.177 The law should be humancentered, not state-centered.178 Judge Cançado Trindade did not want a state
to be able to murder its own population or that of another state and then
simply claim sovereign immunity to avoid liability, as sovereign immunity
was not designed for that purpose.179 Judge Cançado Trindade also noted
that because these acts were violations of jus cogens, the distinction between
acte jure gestionis and acte jure imperii is irrelevant, as that distinction was
not meant to provide immunity for clear violations of international
humanitarian law.180
169
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CASE IMPLICATIONS
The issues surrounding reparations for gross human rights violations
during World War II are still being litigated over sixty years after the fact.
First, Germany’s reparations and Foundation program were clearly
insufficient and used technicalities in labeling to avoid compensating certain
groups of victims.181 Second, the ICJ appears to be shying away from the
current trend of restrictive immunity, particularly in cases with severe human
rights implications, leaving victims with no reliable or reasonable means of
reparations. Lastly, this retreat from restrictive jurisdiction could potentially
have a huge effect on the United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA).182 The United States should take the lead in adopting
legislation restricting immunity for gross violations of human rights because
the potential implications are enormous.
A. Germany’s Insufficient and Incompetent Reparations and Foundation
Germany’s efforts to make complete reparations were insufficient and
dictated by the economic concerns of its large corporations. While Germany
was obligated to make reparations for victims after World War II, the
London Agreement delayed reparations until peace was finalized.183
Discussion on reparations was revived only after the “Two Plus Four” Treaty
fashioned legal peace.184 Because Germany did not recognize forced laborers
in their reparation settlements, private companies, such as Ford Werke and
Bayer AG, faced immense class action suits, particularly in the United
States.185
To ease the strain of extensive litigation on private industry, Germany
created the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy for any reparations
claims.186 However, the Foundation was clearly insufficient, refusing to
provide a real apology and requiring that participating companies only pay a
maximum of 1% to 1.5% of their annual sales.187 These insufficiencies
forced victims to try other avenues for reparations, catalyzing the line of
Italian cases leading up to the ICJ case.188 Often victims are less concerned
181
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with the monetary amount, than they are with having their case heard and
their plight acknowledged. By ignoring victims’ pain and suffering,
Germany may have inadvertently encouraged litigation by those who still felt
slighted.
Additionally, Germany engaged in procedural technicalities to avoid
compensating certain classes of victims. The ICJ
consider[ed] that it is a matter of surprise — and regret — that
Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims
on the ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at
the relevant time, Germany had refused to recognize,
particularly since those victims had thereby been denied the
legal protection to which that status entitled them.189
Hopefully, the ICJ’s surprise and regret will encourage action and lead to
further reparations agreements to ensure that these severe human rights
violations are addressed. Even if Germany no longer feels morally
responsible and does not feel the necessity of a sincere apology, it should
still make reparations as an example for other countries. The ICJ should not
downplay human rights violations by not holding a country responsible.
B. The ICJ’s Failure to Recognize an Emerging Trend of Restrictive
Immunity Leaves Victims with No Reliable Reparations
By ignoring the current trend in national courts towards restrictive
immunity, the ICJ leaves victims with no reliable means of reparations.
International tribunals appear to have a more expansive view of sovereign
immunity than national courts do, a phenomenon that can be seen, for
example, in cases where the ECHR has refused to grant jurisdiction.190
Nevertheless, these cases in the ECHR were decided by narrow majorities,191
and the court recognized an international trend towards limiting sovereign
immunity for civil claims caused by an act or omission in the forum state.192
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Unfortunately, the ICJ did not take this opportunity to recognize this
international trend and did not hold Germany liable for serious human rights
violations. By refusing to rule on a territorial tort exception,193 the ICJ
effectively barred many victims from any recovery. In CIL, the territorial
tort principle works to hold insurance companies liable despite any claim of
sovereign immunity by the foreign state.194 Even if the foreign country could
claim sovereign immunity, it is not allowed to do so for a tort committed in
the forum state if it carries insurance for that tort. The ICJ refused to extend
this tort exception to all civil claims by a foreign state in the forum
country.195
The territorial tort exception should be expanded to include un-insurable
claims as well, in part because it would be absurd to require countries to
carry “human rights insurance” like they carry vehicle insurance. If
countries were liable for human rights violations, there would be an incentive
to create such an insurance pool. However, not only would it be impossible
to force every country to purchase such insurance, there would be no way to
manage such a pool or enforce its obligations.
In addition to difficulties of collecting from every country in the world,
having an insurance program providing reparations for victims of human
rights violations may create a moral hazard, allowing countries to commit
whatever atrocities they desire without concern for the costs of future
liability. However, in spite of its shortcomings, a human rights violations
insurance pool appears to be the only opportunity future victims will have for
any reparations for torts committed by states in foreign territory.
If a country knew that it would be liable for human rights violations, even
its most vicious leaders may make more thoughtful decisions, not wanting to
threaten their national economy or impose economic uncertainty on their
national industry. When industry faces uncertainty, particularly uncertainty
involving large class action lawsuits, its value drops. In an increasingly
global and competitive market, companies need every advantage they can
get. Uncertainty from potential class action suits could upset a state’s
corporations and have detrimental effects on the state’s economy. Political
leaders would most likely consider these economic effects when making
decisions regarding human rights violations, as they want to preserve their
economy and not threaten their companies’ global presence.196
193
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The ICJ should have taken this opportunity to enunciate a bright-line rule
abolishing sovereign immunity for gross human rights violations. Although
immunity may be seen as furthering “orderly international relations,” “it also
blocks accountability and denies redress” to victims of violations of jus
cogens.197 Opponents of a bright-line test may worry this would require the
court to make a determination on the merits of whether the action at issue
constitutes a gross human rights violation before granting jurisdiction and
actually hearing the case. This would mean that a court might spend a long
time determining the facts of the case and whether there was a gross human
rights violation only to discover that it lacked jurisdiction. An easy way to
fix this problem would be to allow individuals to bring a case directly before
the ICJ or establish another forum for victims of human rights violations,
especially for cases where the violations are obvious and admitted by the
perpetrating state (as in this case, where Germany admitted its liability).198
Because victims are not allowed to bring a case individually before the ICJ,
they are forced to rely on their country to do so. This puts too much power
in the hands of the country, rather than the victims who suffered. There is no
reason why victims should be denied reparations for gross human rights
violations, particularly where the perpetrating state has admitted its error but
taken insufficient action for reparations. The international community
should not support such failures.
C. Because of the ICJ’s Ruling, the FSIA May Be in Jeopardy and the
United States Should Take the Lead in Protecting Victims of Human Rights
Violations
The United States should take the lead in protecting individuals from
human rights violations by amending the FSIA to include such violations.
As a result of the ICJ’s decision not to restrict sovereign immunity, the U.S.
FSIA may be in jeopardy because it restricts foreign states’ sovereign
immunity for tortious acts or omissions that occur in the United States.199
The FSIA denies foreign states immunity from suits seeking damages for a
tortious act or omission resulting in personal injury, death, or damage to or
loss of property occurring in the United States.200 Additionally, in 1996 the
United States amended the FSIA to include the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, which provides further exceptions to sovereign immunity,
stating:
197
198
199
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a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States . . . in which money damages are
sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that
was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support
or resources for such an act. . . .201
The language in both these sections seems outside the scope of immunity
provided for by the ICJ and could easily be classified as a territorial tort
exception for un-insurable claims, which was not allowed in this case. If
American citizens had been deported by a foreign state and forced to live in
horrendous conditions while performing slave labor, those victims could
bring a claim in the United States under the FSIA.
It is also interesting to note that in 1789 the United States enacted the
Alien Tort Statute, which provides jurisdiction in the United States for any
civil action brought by an alien for a tort committed “in violation of the law
of nations [(jus cogens)] or a treaty of the United States.”202 United States
courts have, incorrectly, refused to extend an exception from immunity in
cases of human rights violations. By readdressing these rulings, the United
States can take the lead in fighting gross human rights violations. Precedent
for such a reevaluation already exists. In 1985, a district court found that
Congress implied an exception in the FSIA for violations of international law
even though it was not explicitly stated.203 The Second Circuit also upheld
an international law exception to the FSIA, was overturned by the Supreme
Court in Argentine Republic Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.204 The Supreme
Court held the FSIA was intended to be comprehensive and did not include
an international law exception.205 The Ninth Circuit considered whether
there should be a jus cogens exception to sovereign immunity for torture
under the commercial exception of the FSIA.206 Even though the court
appeared to want to impose liability on Argentina, it was constrained by the
Amerada case and unable to deny Argentina sovereign immunity despite the
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fact that a torture allegation was more serious than the international law rules
discussed in Amerada.207
Unfortunately, United States courts are still constrained by the Amerada
rule and construe the FSIA to grant immunity to a foreign state, even when it
violates CIL. Congress contemplated a “human rights exception” to the
FSIA,208 but all the bills creating a sovereign immunity exception to the FSIA
for human rights violations, either at home or abroad, were defeated.209 The
legislative branch needs to take a stand in this area as it alone can change the
status quo. Congress needs to pass an amendment to the FSIA prohibiting
violations of human rights that amount to breaches of jus cogens. Congress
already refuses to grant sovereign immunity when the tort occurs in the
United States, so it is only common sense that there should be no immunity
for such acts if they occur outside the United States.210 For example, an
Italian citizen injured by Germans in the United States deserves no less
protection than an Italian citizen injured by Germans in Italy. Congress
should address the Amerada decision and should amend the FSIA to deny
foreign states sovereign immunity for torts and human rights violations that
they commit outside the United States.
The potential implications of granting sovereign immunity for gross
violations of human rights are enormous. Essentially, countries are given
free rein to invade other countries, commit gross human rights violations,
and then claim sovereign immunity if their victims ever try to hold them
responsible. For example, would anyone allow the United States to get away
with enslaving Iraqis during Operation Iraqi Freedom and then denying those
victims reparations for those injustices? The international community would
be up in arms if that were to happen. Why is it acceptable for Germany
during World War II but not the United States in the Iraq War? While
liability must cease at some point, all countries should be held to the same
standards, particularly when it comes to jus cogens.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States must take a stand in front of the global community and
deny sovereign immunity to states that have committed gross violations of
human rights. Unfortunately the ICJ did not seize its opportunity to follow
the current CIL trend and create precedent by allowing civil claims to be
207

Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 718–19.
Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to Human Rights Litigation—Is Amendment
Necessary and Possible?, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 338 (1992).
209
Rosen, supra note 206, at 494–95. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 934-103 (1993).
210
Scott A. Richman, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA Grant
Immunity for Violations of Jus Cogens Noms?, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 967, 994–95 (1993).
208

802

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:775

brought against Germany in other states for atrocities committed in those
states by the Third Reich. Germany has not made proper reparations over
sixty years after the fact and punishment is long overdue. Holding Germany
liable will act as a deterrent against future human rights violations. Martha,
and others like her, should have an opportunity for compensation for the
great wrongs they have suffered.

